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Abstract 
Over the past decades, there is an increased trend in the international financial 
integration as countries are removing and relaxing controls on cross-border 
investment. Capital can flow easily to the destination that offers higher returns as the 
results of decreasing obstacles to international investment. However, despite well 
documented gains from international diversification, investors continue to have a 
strong preference for domestic assets.  
This paper characterizes the salient nature of the composition of the Australian equity 
portfolio investment. In addition, the paper investigates the determinants of the 
Australian investors’ home bias in equity portfolio investment. Employing the 
disaggregated data for the holding of Australian investors abroad from the 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) conducted by IMF for the year 1997, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, we provide an insight into the causes of the home 
bias puzzle by empirically analysing the role of explicit barriers to international 
investment (capital controls and transaction costs) and implicit barriers (governance 
and information asymmetries).  
JEL Classifications: E22, F15, F41 
Keywords: home bias, portfolio equity investment, transaction costs, volatility, 
liquidity.  
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THE DETERMINANTS OF HOME BIAS PUZZLE IN 
EQUITY PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT IN AUSTRALIA 
 
1. Introduction 
There is an increased trend towards international financial integration as countries are 
removing and relaxing controls on cross-border investment. The potential benefits of 
international diversification have been acknowledged theoretically. Many papers 
suggest that the risk of an investment portfolio can be reduced by incorporating 
foreign equities (De Santis & Gerard 1997; Eldor, Pines & Schwartz 1988; Grauer & 
Hakansson 1987; Grubel 1968; Solnik 1974; Stulz 1997). However, despite well 
documented gains from international diversification, investors continue to have a 
strong preference for domestic assets. Various empirical studies challenge the 
assumption of international diversification yielding high returns. This phenomenon is 
dubbed as the home bias puzzle by financial economists, ie. actual share of foreign 
equity in equity portfolio is normally lower than predicted by a capital asset pricing 
model. Engel (2000) identifies that home bias in equity portfolio is one of the three 
“core puzzles” in international macroeconomics (why is so little diversification 
observed?).  
 
The explanations provided for home bias in asset holdings is one of the least 
contentious empirical findings in international finance. The international capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM), based on traditional portfolio theory developed by Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965), predicts that mean-variance optimizing investors should 
hold the world market portfolio of risky assets. If the international CAPM (ICAPM) 
holds then the world market portfolio is an efficient portfolio and the proportion of the 
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wealth invested in a domestic equity market should be equal to its weight in the world 
market portfolio (Adler & Dumas 1983; Fama & French 1998; Karolyi & Stulz 2002; 
Solnik 1983). In an international setting, the optimal investment weights of a country 
according to ICAPM are given by the relative shares of domestic and foreign equities 
in the world market capitalization. Hence, under the assumptions of the classical 
model, the ICAPM provides the optimal portfolio weights which are the relative 
world market capitalization shares.  
 
The recent surge in international integration appears to challenge the puzzle through 
both its global and regional components. Even though integration, technological and 
financial development appears to work consistently to erode the home bias issue, 
investors should diversify their equity holding to the optimal weights to achieve the 
benefits of international diversification, empirical facts suggest that there is still a 
large component of wealth of investors is invested in the domestic markets (Ahearne, 
Griever & Warnock 2004; Cooper & Kaplanis 1994a, 1994b, 1994c; French & 
Poterba 1991; Tesar & Werner 1995). As quoted in Cai & Warnock (2004), the share 
of foreign equities in U.S. portfolios is very low at only 15 percent, while the ICAPM 
would imply that investors, regardless of their domicile, should have a 44 percent 
weight on U.S. equities and a 56 percent weight on the equities of other countries as 
end of 2003. Using the same method, we estimate that the share of foreign equity in 
Australian equity portfolio is 17.28% and 16.76% while the optimal holding is 
98.20% and 98.15% as end of 2003 and 2005 respectively. 
 
There are many possible explanations for the home bias puzzle. The motive behind 
the puzzle is that investors are facing both explicit barriers and implicit barriers when 
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investing overseas. The paper will focus on these barriers as drivers of the home bias 
in Australian equity portfolio where a strong preference for domestic assets incurred.  
 
Explicit barriers to international investment are those that are directly observable and 
quantifiable. For instance, a restriction on foreign exchange transactions is an explicit 
barrier to international investment. Explicit barriers to international investment have 
fallen over time because of, for instance, international tax accords and the removal of 
foreign exchange controls. However, there are still visible barriers to foreign 
investment, so that some home bias should still exist. French and Poterba (1991) and 
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994c) argue that explicit barriers to international investment 
are no longer large enough to explain the observed portfolio allocations of investors. 
They suggest that, to explain the home-bias puzzle, these barriers would have to be 
much larger than withholding taxes, which often are mentioned as the most significant 
observable deterrent to foreign investment. If barriers to international investment are 
the same across securities in a foreign country, foreign investors should tilt their 
portfolios toward securities that have a higher expected excess return (Stulz 1981). If 
explicit barriers differ across securities, foreign investors will prefer securities that 
have lower explicit barrier (Kang & Stulz 1997).  
 
Implicit barriers to international investment, on the other hand, are not directly 
observable. As explicit barriers have fallen, researchers have put more emphasis on 
obstacles to foreign investment that cannot be identified from brokerage statements. 
The two main classes of such barriers are political risk differences between domestic 
and foreign investors and information asymmetries. Political risk differences arise if 
non-resident investors feel that there is some probability that they might have trouble 
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repatriating their holdings or that their holdings might be expropriated altogether, so 
that their expected return on foreign shares is lower than the expected return for 
residents. Information asymmetries are self explanatory. 
 
The paper has strong implication for the international portfolio investment and 
portfolio allocation. As the increasing global international financial integration leads 
to an increase in the international capital mobility and international equity investment, 
investors can diversify their equity portfolio internationally at cheaper costs. The 
identification of the relevant markets frictions causing home bias shed further light 
into the futures geographical changes of portfolio allocation. The continuous process 
of international financial integration and the on-going demographic changes are likely 
lead to a change in the allocation of equity portfolio. It is important to understand 
about the effects of barriers and market frictions on capital mobility and home bias.  
 
The extent of the home bias puzzle needed to be addressed to provide an insight into 
factors drive the deviation from the optimal international equity portfolio. If investors 
more generally already hold the optimal portfolio, then the diversification gains are 
achieved. However, the literature suggests that portfolios are not optimal and that the 
cost in terms of lower return and higher risk is large. Lewis (1999) argues that costs of 
home bias due to forgone gains from international diversification in the range of 20% 
to almost double of lifetime (permanent) consumption. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews the literature 
on the home bias puzzle. Section three introduces the model setting and data 
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description. Section four reports the empirical results. Finally, section five concludes 
the paper.  
 
2. Literature Review 
The home bias puzzle has been widely documented in the literature. The main drivers 
of home bias in international equity investment are explicit and implicit barriers to 
international investment. The prime targets are explicit barriers including transaction 
costs (fees, commissions and higher spreads) (Glassman & Riddick 2001; Tesar & 
Werner 1995; Warnock 2001) and capital controls (Black 1974; Errunza & Losq 
1981; Stulz 1981).  However, if investors care only about the mean and the variance 
of the real return of their invested wealth, and if barriers to international investment 
are gradually removed as many observers suggest, one would expect investors, as a 
first approximation, to hold the world market portfolio of stocks. However, the facts 
that investors continue to hold a large portion of domestic equities in their portfolio, 
even in times when most direct obstacles to foreign investment have disappeared 
(Baele, Pungulescu & Horst 2006). Important contributions focus on differences in 
the amount and quality of information between domestic and foreign stocks (Brennan 
& Cao 1997; Gehrig 1993; Hasan & Simaan 2000; Veldkamp & Nieuwerburgh 2005) 
on hedging of non-traded goods consumption as a motive for holding domestic 
securities (Adler & Dumas 1983; Cooper & Kaplanis 1994a; Stockman & Dellas 
1989) and more recently on psychological or behavioral factors (Coval & Moskowitz 
1999; Grinblatt & Keloharju 2000; Huberman 2001). Several explanations have been 
suggested for this so-called home bias in portfolios, but so far no explanation seems to 
be generally accepted or fully account for the observed home bias in international 
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financial markets (Ahearne, Griever & Warnock 2004; Baele, Pungulescu & Horst 
2006). 
Black (1974) and Stulz (1981) develop a two country capital market equilibrium 
model where there are barriers to cross border investment and these barriers can be 
considered as tax on net foreign investment. This tax represents various kinds of 
barriers to international investment such as direct controls on the import or export of 
capital, possibility of expropriation of foreign holdings, reserve requirements on bank 
deposits and other assets held by foreigners, restrictions on the fraction of business 
that is owned by foreigners. It may also include barriers due to information 
asymmetries i.e. unfamiliarity of residents of one country with the stock markets of 
other countries.  
 
Cooper and Lessard (1981) develop an international capital market equilibrium model 
which allows for differential taxes on foreign investment depending on the country of 
investment and the origin of investor. They obtain unique solutions for taxes under 
extreme assumptions that taxes depend on the country of investment, or on the origin 
of investor. Merton (1987) introduces a model where investors hold stocks that they 
know. In this model, investors think that the risk of stocks they do not know is 
extremely high. Accordingly, the investors may overweight domestic stocks.  Cooper 
and Kaplanis (1994a) find that hedging against inflation risk cannot explain the home 
bias.   
 
A steadily growing literature has proposed several partly competing and partly 
complementary explanations for the cause of the home bias puzzle (Cooper & 
Kaplanis 1994a, 1994b, 1994c; French & Poterba 1991; Tesar & Werner 1995). An 
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important strand of this literature focuses on the effect of transaction and information 
costs on international portfolio positions, as e.g. in Cai and Warnock (2004), Portes 
and Rey (1999), Daude and Fratzscher (2006) and Fidora et al (2007). Shiller et al. 
(1991; 1996) provide some survey evidence consistent with the view that investors are 
more optimistic about their own market than are foreign investors. Frankel and 
Schmukler (1996; 2000) have examined an important aspect of portfolio investment 
in emerging markets, namely, possible informational asymmetry between domestic 
and international investors. 
 
Moreover, departures from mean-variance optimization would suggest that investors 
might be tailoring their asset holdings to hedge against changes in variables that 
matter to them. Stulz (1981) argues that investors' desire to hedge against 
unanticipated changes in their consumption and investment opportunities might lead 
to a home bias. 
 
There are several papers investigating the home bias puzzle employing the individual 
countries data set but due to data limitation, most of the papers focus on US data 
(Ahearne, Griever & Warnock 2004; Dahlquist et al. 2003). Papers employ other 
country data sets including: Kang & Stulz (1997) investigate the home bias in Japan 
employing the firm-level data. They found that the portfolio holdings of foreign 
investors do not follow the existing models which suggested the holdings are tilted 
towards stocks with high expected returns.  This paper confirmed that there is a 
substantial home bias by foreign investors investing in Japan. French and Poterba 
(1991) argue that the holdings of Japanese investors in the US and the holdings of US 
investors in Japan can be explained if Japanese investors are substantially more 
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optimistic about the expected return of Japanese shares than are American investors. 
Dahlquist & Robertsson (2001) explored the puzzle in Sweden using the firm level 
data set of ownership and attributes of Swedish firms. They find that foreign investors 
allocate a disproportionately high share of their funds to large firms, as size might be 
a proxy for many underlying sources, including firm recognition. In addition, they 
conclude that market liquidity seems to be an important driving force for the 
preference. Kim & Wei (2002) examined the Korea market and considers the 
importance of the physical presence of investors in Korea.  
 
However, not many authors examine the determinant of home bias in equity portfolio 
investment of Australian investors. This might be due to the problems that there are 
not adequate data on international holdings until the CPIS survey conducted by IMF. 
From this perspective, this paper fills the gap in investigating the puzzle employing 
the disaggregated data set on Australian equity holding.  
 
3. Model and Data description 
 
The first task is to how to measure home bias. In this paper, the home bias of 
Australian investors in equity investment against country i is measured as the 
deviation of the actual cross-border holdings from the optimal portfolio weight 
investors should invest in country i. Any meaningful explanation of the equity home 
bias requires a correct characterization of the benchmark optimal weights. We 
measure home bias under the assumptions of the classical model in home bias studies, 
the International CAPM (ICAPM), optimal portfolio holding in country i is given by 
the relative world market capitalization shares (Baele, Pungulescu & Horst 2006).  
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In this paper, we quantify the home bias of Australian investors against country i as 
the relative difference between the Australian actual (ACTi) and optimal (OPTi) 
equity investment in country i.  
HBi = 1 – ACTi/OPTi
The actual holding is the actual share of country i’s equity holding in the Australian 
portfolio. The holding which is calculated from the CPIS data1. However, the CPIS 
does not report the amount of domestic security holding. Therefore, in order to derive 
the domestic component of Australian portfolio, we directly estimate it as the 
difference of Australian equity market capitalization and the aggregate foreign equity 
portfolio investment in Australia.  The Australian equity market capitalization data are 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator and the aggregate foreign 
equity portfolio investment in Australia is also reported by CPIS.  
 
The optimal equity holding in country i is given by the International CAPM. Most 
studies have conveniently assumed that asset returns are well described by the 
International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM), in which case the benchmark 
weights are simply given by the proportion each country has in the global equity 
market portfolio (Fidora, Fratzsc & Thimann 2007) . Hence, the optimal holding is the 
share of country i in the world portfolio.  
 
For a brief comparison, table 6.1 shows the share of Foreign Equity, Optimal Share 
and Home Bias in Australian Equity Portfolio in 1997 and 2005. A quick glance at 
this table it can be seen that Australian investors invest a large share of their equity 
portfolio in large markets of the US and UK. Another reason might be both US and 
                                                 
1 The CPIS data are available for the following years: 1997, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005.  
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UK are English speaking country. The table also indicates that the deviation from the 
optimal share is smaller in 2005 than in 1997 where the Home Bias proxy is larger in 
most country.  
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Table 0-1 Share of Foreign Equity, Optimal Share and Home Bias in Australian Equity Portfolio 
in 1997 and 2005 
 
Destination Portfolio Share 
Optimal 
Share 
Home Bias Portfolio Share Optimal 
Share 
Home Bias 
 1997 2005 
Austria 0.000115 0.001110 0.896420 0.00017917 0.002895 0.938101 
Belgium 0.000206 0.004255 0.951555  0.007494   
Brazil 0.000461 0.007937 0.941893  0.010876   
Canada 0.001154 0.017635 0.934586  0.033933   
Chile 0.000011 0.002238 0.994980  0.003126   
China 0.000127 0.006411 0.980184 0.00024312 0.017890 0.986411 
Colombia  0.000607   0.00000722 0.001054 0.993154 
Czech  0.000397   0.00001998 0.000879 0.977259 
Denmark 0.000246 0.002913 0.915490  0.004080   
Finland 0.000343 0.002278 0.849268 0.00049797 0.004801 0.896267 
France 0.003914 0.020951 0.813205  0.039183   
Germany 0.003843 0.025638 0.850123 0.00443670 0.027983 0.841452 
Greece 0.000063 0.001061 0.940435  0.003323   
Hong Kong  0.002310 0.012841 0.820139 0.00203400 0.023056 0.911782 
Hungary 0.000071 0.000465 0.847831  0.000746   
India 0.000144 0.003991 0.963862 0.00080656 0.012673 0.936356 
Indonesia 0.000192 0.000904 0.787139 0.00009453 0.001866 0.949334 
Ireland 0.000127 0.001534 0.917369  0.002615   
Israel 0.000030 0.001406 0.978515  0.002752   
Italy 0.002375 0.010708 0.778223  0.018289   
Japan 0.010178 0.068868 0.852210 0.01576152 0.108531 0.854774 
Korea 0.000196 0.001431 0.863327 0.00231907 0.016456 0.859076 
Luxembourg  0.001053   0.00007031 0.001174 0.940130 
Malaysia 0.000364 0.002908 0.874878 0.00018742 0.004153 0.954870 
Mexico 0.000344 0.004865 0.929325  0.005479   
Netherlands 0.002118 0.014562 0.854568 0.00985280 0.016670 0.408952 
New Zealand 0.000245 0.000948 0.741683 0.00128048 0.000931 -0.375760 
Norway 0.000295 0.002066 0.857282 0.00045748 0.004375 0.895443 
Peru 0.000076 0.000546 0.860880 0.00000267 0.000825 0.996768 
Philippines 0.000129 0.000974 0.867355  0.000920   
Poland  0.000972   0.00000507 0.002151 0.997642 
Portugal 0.000150 0.001885 0.920512 0.00009710 0.001535 0.936732 
Russia  0.001209    0.012570   
Singapore 0.000557 0.004748 0.882669 0.00117324 0.004773 0.754188 
South Africa 0.000156 0.006367 0.975521  0.012956   
Spain 0.000875 0.015665 0.944168  0.021998   
Sweden 0.001306 0.010201 0.872015  0.009256   
Switzerland 0.003233 0.024615 0.868657  0.021507   
Thailand 0.000109 0.000916 0.881541 0.00023241 0.002831 0.917898 
Turkey 0.000139 0.002164 0.935966 0.00005433 0.003701 0.985322 
UK 0.014709 0.080061 0.816280 0.01363741 0.070074 0.805386 
US 0.041374 0.469246 0.911829 0.09108298 0.389486 0.766146 
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The model is set up as folllows: 
tititi XHB ,,, εβα ++=  
where HBi,t is the measure of Australian home bias against country I at time t. Xi,t is a 
vector of explanatory variables that considered as the determinants of the Australian 
investors home bias, which are explicit and implicit barriers to international equity 
investment considered as follows.  
 
Explicit Barriers to international investment 
Explicit barriers to international investment are directly observable and quantifiable. 
Black (1974), Stulz (1981), and Errunza and Losq (1981) suggested that the direct 
barriers to international investment are a main target for explanation of the home bias 
puzzle. In this paper, we consider two measures of direct barriers to international 
investment that might prevent investors from investing in optimal portfolio, which are 
transaction costs and capital controls.  
 
Transaction Cost: (TRANS) 
Traditionally, investors would invest in a country where the costs are minimized and 
would underweight high transaction cost countries’ in their portfolios. Tesar & 
Werner (1995), Glassman and Riddick (2001), and Warnock & Cleaver (2002) 
documented that transaction costs are prime explanations for the home bias puzzle.  
However, results in Domowitz et al. (2001) suggest that transaction costs cannot 
explain the home bias U.S. equity portfolios. The paper from Warnock (Warnock 
2001) tends to support this view.  
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Transaction costs are the total of the commissions, fees and market impact costs 
which are complied by Elkins-McSherry Co, a firm that conducts cost studies for 
institutional traders and serves as a consultant to stock exchanges. Elkins-McSherry 
Co. receives trade data on all global trades by institutional traders and computes 
measures of trading costs. Market impact costs, or liquidity costs, are intended to 
measure the deviation of the transaction price from the price that would have 
prevailed had the trade not occurred. In practice, impact costs are measured as the 
deviation of the transaction price from day’s average price. Further information on the 
transaction costs data is provided by Domowitz et al. (2001). This variable is expected 
to have a positive impact on HB.  
 
Capital control (CONTROL) 
Over the last decades, countries are trying to remove cross-border controls, relax 
restriction on capital movement. However, these controls are still expected to have an 
effect on cross-border investment that contributes to the phenomenon of home bias.  
Empirical work on the effects of capital controls on portfolios has been hampered by 
the lack of a widely accepted cross-country measure of the intensity of capital 
controls (Ahearne, Griever & Warnock 2004). There are many measures of capital 
controls in the economics literature, but most are dummy variables based on 
restrictions reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions; see the survey by Eichengreen (2001). In the finance 
literature, researchers have dated liberalizations, see for example, Bekaert and Harvey 
(2000), but provide no measure of the intensity of controls. 
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To address the issue that binary rule-based variable fails to distinguish between 
different types of control and in reviewing all of the available de jure measures of 
capital controls and based on the AREAER, Miniane (2004) develops a measure for 
34 countries for the period from 1983 to 2000. This index offers substantial 
disaggregation between controls. However, this measure still has disadvantages 
including limited coverage and there is no distinction between controls on inflows and 
outflows. Following the methodology of Miniane  (2004), a variable that proxy for the 
barrier to international investment is constructed. This measure is the average of the 
14 sub-criteria from the IMF publication “Annual report on Exchange Restrictions 
and Exchange Arrangements”. This index is expected to have a positive impact on 
Australian investors’ home bias in portfolio equity investment against destination 
countries.  
 
Implicit Barriers to International Investment 
French and Poterba (1991) and Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) argue that explicit 
barriers to international investment are no longer large enough to explain the observed 
portfolio allocations of investors. If barriers to international investment are the same 
across securities in a foreign country, foreign investors should tilt their portfolios 
toward securities that have a higher expected excess return (Stulz 1981). If explicit 
barriers differ across securities, foreign investors will prefer securities that have lower 
explicit barrier. Implicit barriers to international investment are not directly 
observable and quantifiable.  
 
Bilateral Trade between Australia and the country of concern (TRADE) 
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Merton (1987) argues that investors invest in the securities they know about. If 
investors behave this way, we would expect foreign investors to invest more in 
securities that are known abroad. Trade link can be considered as a factor of 
information cost in investing the home bias puzzle. Increasing trade link between a 
country with another can be considered as a reduction in the information cost as 
investors can get the information at a cheaper cost. For example, investors are better 
able to attain accounting and regulatory information on foreign markets through trade. 
On the other hand, investors may be inclined to hold the stocks of foreign companies 
with whose products they are most familiar. Indeed, there is an increasing recognition 
of the link between trade in goods and services and trade in assets. Hummels et al. 
(2001) and Yi  (2003) examine the importance of trade growth and suggest that the 
striking growth in the trade share of output is one of the most important developments 
in the world economy. Increased trade openness is also one of major factors 
influencing globalization. According to Lane & Milesi-Ferretti  (2003), trade 
openness may contribute to the increased international financial integration and the 
erosion of the home bias issue for several reasons. Firstly, trade in goods directly 
results in corresponding financial transactions such as trade credit, transportation 
costs and export insurance. Secondly, as stated by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), there 
is a close connection between the gains to international financial diversification and 
the extent of goods trade: trade costs create an international wedge between marginal 
rates of substitution and hence limit the gains to asset trade. Thirdly, goods trade and 
financial positions are jointly determined in some situations, as is often the case with 
FDI, given the importance of intra-firm intermediate trade. Finally, openness in goods 
markets may increase the willingness to conduct cross-border financial transactions, 
reducing financial home bias (a ‘familiarity’ effect) (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti 2003).  
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 TRADE variable is the ratio of bilateral trade (import + export) between Australia and 
the destination countries to the destination country’s GDP. This variable can be 
expected to have a negative impact on home bias. The data on imports and exports is 
taken from IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics and GDP data is from World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. The data on imports and exports is taken from IMF’s 
Direction of Trade Statistics and GDP data is from World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. This variable is expected to have a negavite impact on HB.  
 
Governance Indicator (GOVERNANCE)  
Quality of government is a very important factor that affects the portfolio investment. 
The quality of government indicators proxy for the role of information asymmetries 
that arise from differences in accounting standards, disclosure requirements and 
regulatory environments across countries. We employ the Kaufmann et al. (2003) 
governance indicator as an explanatory variable. The governance indicator is the 
average of the six-dimensions of governance including: Voice and Accountability, 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. This indicator ranges from -2.5 to 
2.5 with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. These legal indicators are 
expected to have a negative impact on HB.  
 
Exchange Rate Volatility (VOLATILITY) 
Recently, there is a trend to investigate the causal relationship between home bias and 
the foreign exchange rate volatility and uncertainty. The recent paper by Fidora et al. 
(Fidora, Fratzsc & Thimann 2007)  focuses on the role of real exchange rate volatility 
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as a driver of home bias in portfolio holdings. This paper also incorporates the foreign 
exchange rate volatility as a driver of equity home bias.  
 
Equity Market Liquidity (LIQUIDITY):  
As foreign investors are disadvantaged against domestic investors in a market, 
therefore, it might be able to establish a link between the market liquidity and home 
bias. Australian investors will invest more in countries with higher degree of market 
liquidity (Domowitz, Glen & Madhavan 2001).  
We use the ratio of value of stock traded to GDP to proxy for the liquidity of the 
equity market. Data are collected from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. This variable is expected to have a negative sign on HB.  
 
Historial Risk-Adjusted Returns (REWRISK) 
Another variable that is important is the role of historical risk-adjusted returns. If 
portfolio decisions are based partly on past returns, then investors might tend to 
underweight countries whose stock markets have performed poorly. To capture this 
type of momentum or ‘returns-chasing’ behavior as in Bohn and Tesar (1996) and 
Ahearne et al. (2004), we construct a reward-to-risk ratio, the mean monthly return 
over its standard deviation of the destination country. This is calculated as the ratio of 
the historical average of monthly returns of the MCSI (local country) index and 
standard deviation of returns over the preceding year.  The data are obtained from 
DataStream. This variable is expected to have a negative impact on the HB.  
 
Market size (SIZE):  
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Martin & Rey (2004) and Portes & Rey (2005) demonstrate the importance of size of 
economies for cross-border equity investment. We also include a proxy for the market 
size as an explanatory variable. This is the ratio of the destination market 
capitalization to the world capitalization. Data are collected from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. This variable is expected to have a negative impact 
on the HB.  
 
There are also other information friction factors that are likely to affect home bias in 
equity portfolio.  
 
Language (LANGUAGE) 
This variable is equal to one when the destination country language is English or zero 
otherwise. Data are collected from the CIA World Factbook. The assumption is that 
Australian investors will be less biased against English speaking countries and 
expected to have a negative sign.  
 
Distance from the Australian Capital (DISTANCE) 
We also consider the distance from Australia capital to the capital city of trading 
partner country as an explanatory variable which is considered as explicit costs of 
information friction. Martin & Rey (2004) and Portes & Rey (2005) show that 
distance is a good proxy for information cost. Distance data are computed from 
www.indo.com/distance. This variable enters the regression in log form. This variable 
is expected to have a positive sign.  
 
Telephone cost between Australia and the destination country (PHONE) 
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In this paper, we use the cost of 5 mins call from Australia to the destination country. 
Telephone cost data are from http://www.phone-rate-calculator.com/. This variable 
enters the regression in log form. This variable is expected to have a positive sign.  
Dividend Imputation:  
Australian tax law favours domestic over foreign stock holding. We assume this 
factor is constant over the estimated period.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Figure 6.1 exhibits the share of Australian Equity Portfolio invested in Australia. The 
continuous line represents the actual holding while the dotted line represents optimal 
holding. It indicates that in 1997, about 91% of Australian equity portfolio is invested 
locally and gradually reduces to 83.24% in 2005, while the ratio of Australian market 
capitalization to the world market capitalization is about 1.15% in 1997 and 1.84% in 
2005. According to the ICAPM, Australian investors leave out the gains from 
international diversification as they invest a large share of their equity portfolio 
domestically.  
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Figure 0-1  Share of Australian Equity Portfolio Invested Domestically 
Share of Domestic Equity in Australian Equity Portfolio
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Figure 6.2 to 6.7 graphs Australian investors’ home bias measure against 42 other 
foreign countries in the year 1997, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. Of 
particular note is that in the year 2005, Australian investors overweight their 
investment in New Zealand according to the ICAMP. This might be due to the fact 
that New Zealand has close geographical proximity and close affinity in terms of 
culture, language, legal origin, regulatory environment etc. with Australia. Hence, 
Australian investors are better informed about New Zealand’s investment scenario 
and overweight their equity investment in New Zealand.  
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Figure 0-2 Australian investors’ home bias in 1997 
Australian Investors' Home Bias in 1997
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Figure 0-3 Australian investors’ home bias in 2001 
Australian Investors' Home Bias in 2001
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Figure 0-4 Australian investors’ home bias in 2002 
Australian Investors' Home Bias in 2002
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Figure 0-5 Australian investors’ home bias in 2003 
Australian Investors' Home Bias in 2003
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A
us
tr
ia
B
el
gi
um
B
ra
zi
l
C
an
ad
a
C
hi
le
C
hi
na
C
ol
om
bi
a
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
ub
lic
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
G
re
ec
e
H
on
g 
K
on
g 
H
un
ga
ry
In
di
a
In
do
ne
si
a
Ire
la
nd
Is
ra
el
Ita
ly
Ja
pa
n
K
or
ea
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
M
al
ay
si
a
M
ex
ic
o
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
nd
N
or
w
ay
Pe
ru
Ph
ili
pp
in
es
Po
la
nd
Po
rt
ug
al
R
us
si
a
Si
ng
ap
or
e
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
a
Sp
ai
n
Sw
ed
en
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Th
ai
la
nd
Tu
rk
ey
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 
 
 23
Figure 0-6 Australian investors’ home bias in 2004 
Australian Investors' Home Bias in 2004
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A
us
tr
ia
B
el
gi
um
B
ra
zi
l
C
an
ad
a
C
hi
le
C
hi
na
C
ol
om
bi
a
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
ub
lic
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
G
re
ec
e
H
on
g 
K
on
g 
H
un
ga
ry
In
di
a
In
do
ne
si
a
Ire
la
nd
Is
ra
el
Ita
ly
Ja
pa
n
K
or
ea
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
M
al
ay
si
a
M
ex
ic
o
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
nd
N
or
w
ay
Pe
ru
Ph
ili
pp
in
es
Po
la
nd
Po
rt
ug
al
R
us
si
a
Si
ng
ap
or
e
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
a
Sp
ai
n
Sw
ed
en
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Th
ai
la
nd
Tu
rk
ey
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 
 
 
Figure 0-7 Australian investors’ home bias in 2005 
Australian Investors' Home Bias in 2005
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Table 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the Australian home bias measure 
against 42 countries. The mean of the home bias indicator is about 88.85 % in 1997, 
slightly increases to 89.08% in 2001, and 90.65% in 2002 but reduce considerably to 
83.87% in 2005.  
 
Table 0-2 Descriptive Statistics for Australian Investors’ home bias 
 
 1997 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
       
Mean 0.8884 0.8908 0.9065 0.8829 0.8894 0.8387
Median 0.8815 0.9137 0.9306 0.9184 0.9103 0.9271
Standard 
Deviation 0.0609 0.1106 0.0718 0.1292 0.1242 0.2869
Minimum 0.7417 0.3836 0.7355 0.2665 0.4073 -0.3758
Maximum 0.9950 0.9920 0.9946 0.9974 0.9983 0.9976
 
The research employs the panel least squares regression with White cross-section 
standard errors and covariance (degree of freedom corrected). As the dependent 
variable, BIAS are strictly lies between -1 and 1, we employ TOBIT as a robust 
check. As the Tobit estimator yields mostly similar results but a different way of 
explanation, we do not report the results here to conserve space. 
 
Table 6.3 presents the panel data regression results for the whole period, 1997, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. At first we allow for the regressions of the Bias and 
individual variable of interest and gradually pulling all variables together in a 
regression. Overall, the empirical results are consistent with the theory as most of the 
variables enter the regressions produces the expected sign.  
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Table 0-3 Panel Regressions for the year whole sample 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant 
0.822128*** 
(35.2153) 
0.840846*** 
(65.0891) 
0.912457*** 
(89.4848) 
0.946891*** 
(65.2346) 
0.823501*** 
(17.1515) 
0.840456*** 
(23.7211) 
0.814189*** 
(20.4975) 
1.208909*** 
(12.9133) 
1.264082*** 
(12.1923) 
TRANS 
0.001069*** 
(2.6677) 
   
0.040442*** 
(2.9165) 
0.023398*** 
(2.4372) 
0.030841** 
(2.1877) 
0.036014** 
(2.2698) 
0.036179** 
(2.2568) 
CONTROL  
0.118872*** 
(4.4554) 
   
0.053893*** 
(4.0292) 
0.043279** 
(2.2676) 
0.034464* 
(1.6946) 
0.034113* 
(1.6939) 
TRADE 
 
  
-2.73946*** 
(-6.0504) 
 
-2.652430** 
(-2.5049) 
-1.330255 
(-9.1692) 
-1.111909 
(-6.4049) 
-1.902129 
(-5.3109) 
-1.948199 
(-5.2689) 
GOVENANCE 
 
   
-0.06682*** 
(-5.6459) 
-
0.049536*** 
(-5.8948) 
-
0.022942*** 
(-4.0722) 
-
0.021268*** 
(-4.2435) 
-
0.017245*** 
(-4.8352) 
-
0.021973*** 
(-3.7717) 
VOLATILITY  
 
 
  
-
0.000245*** 
(-3.7801) 
-
0.000242*** 
(-3.0965) 
-
0.000250*** 
(-3.3769) 
-
0.000293*** 
(-4.0959) 
-
0.000293*** 
(-4.0450) 
SIZE     
-0.077706 
(-.8585) 
0.006715 
(0.0633) 
0.056263 
(0.4552) 
0.063517 
(0.5036) 
0.063026 
(0.4973) 
LIQUIDITY     
-0.000346 
(-1.5129) 
-0.000555** 
(-2.3686) 
-0.000541** 
(-2.3343) 
-0.000558** 
(-2.4330) 
-0.000558** 
(-2.4216) 
REWRISK     
0.003682 
(0.1458) 
0.008714 
(0.4741) 
0.008799 
(0.4618) 
0.012219 
(0.6568) 
0.012603 
(0.6732) 
LANGUAGE       
-0.024163 
(-.9125) 
-0.024792 
(-.9510) 
-0.026078 
(-1.0201) 
DISTANCE        
-
0.043059*** 
(-3.0006) 
-
0.045568*** 
(-3.1537) 
PHONE         
-0.011183* 
(-1.6604) 
Obs 184 134 196 194 179 128 128 126 126 
R-squared 
0.037631 
 
0.130726 
 
0.158745 
 
0.142383 
 
0.319432 0.365021 0.369384 0.377351 0.377913 
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Note:  
The dependent variable is HB, *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively, t-statistic is in parentheses. 
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Transaction costs and capital control variables enter the regression with positive signs 
and significance. This is consistent with the common findings that transaction costs and 
capital controls are important. However, the impact of transaction costs is much less than 
capital controls on portfolio equity bias as the magnitude of the transaction costs 
coefficients are much smaller than that of capital controls.   
 
The result also confirms the link between the home bias phenomenon and trade. 
Increased bilateral trade helps to reduce Australian investors’ equity portfolio home bias 
as the TRADE variable enters the regression with a negative sign and significance. This 
result is consistent with Obstfeld & Rogoff’s (2000) claim. However, Ahearne et al. 
(2004) find a negative (but not significant) relationship between trade and home bias 
employing US data.  
 
Another striking factor that drives Australian investors’ home bias is the exchange rate 
volatility as volatility enters the regressions negatively and significantly at the 1% level. 
It seems that Australian investors are less biased against the countries of which the 
bilateral foreign exchange rates with Australia are more volatile.  
 
The liquidity of foreign markets is also importance in explaining Australian home bias. 
Evidence suggests that Australian investors are investing more in countries with a higher 
degree of liquidity.  
  
 28
Market size is also important as the SIZE variable is not statistically significant in all 
regressions. The REWRISK variable, a measure of risk-adjusted return, is positive but 
insignificant. The binary LANGUAGE variable is negative, however, insignificant.  
The DISTANCE between Australia and its trading partner variable is negatively related 
to BIAS and statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that Australian 
investors seem to underweight their portfolio towards countries with shorter distance, 
contrary to expectation. 
  
5. Conclusion 
Much work has been done in recent years on cross-border capital flows and explaining 
home bias. This paper makes an attempt to investigate the determinants of Australian 
investors’ home bias puzzle employing bilateral cross-border equity portfolio investment 
aboard from the CPIS data set against 42 destination countries. This paper fills the gap in 
the literature concerning the home bias phenomenon of Australian equity portfolio 
investment. In addition, this advanced previous research by employing a longer time-span 
panel data set from CPIS and a number of potential variables considered in the literature 
as potential drivers of home bias.  
 
Overall, the paper presents evidence of a decrease in Australia’s home bias in equity 
portfolio investment from 1997 to 2005. Investigating the potential determinants of home 
bias, the paper has analysed a number of drivers of the home bias phenomenon focusing 
on transaction costs, cross-border capital controls, trade, governance and market size. 
There is evidence that capital controls and transaction costs are positive and statistically 
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significant factors driving the home bias of Australian equity portfolio investment. The 
result confirms the common belief that domestic investors underweight the benefits of 
international diversification by investing a large share of their equity portfolio 
domestically due to higher transaction costs overseas and the cross-border capital 
controls of the destination countries.   
On the other hand, this paper did not incorporate the influence of dividend imputation.  
 
The home bias lessens if the bilateral trade is higher. This implies that the bilateral trade 
alleviates certain information asymmetries in terms of familiarity with the financial and 
legal environment and cultural barriers of the trading partner countries. In addition, the 
results also suggest that Australian investors invest a higher share of their portfolio in 
countries with better institution and larger market size reducing the degree of home bias 
against those countries.  
 
The paper has policy implications. From the perspectives of destination countries, to 
attract foreign investors investing in, capital control barriers should be dismantled for free 
mobility of capital and a greater degree of integration into the world capital markets. 
Furthermore, transaction costs are also other issues hindering foreign investors. The 
negative link between home bias and governance indicator indicates that foreign 
investors prefer to invest more in countries with better institution and legal environment, 
lower corruption and better accounting and disclosure standards.  
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